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Abstract
This article adopts a gender perspective on war, problematising media attention on Yezidi 
women since the attacks by  ISIS. Sinjari Yezidis’ narratives/subjectivities since 2014 are 
silenced in Western media reports in favour of a “hyper-visibility” of women’s “injured 
bodies”, which mobilises a specific narrative of victimhood. Reports from UK and US 
broadsheet newspapers, plus the BBC, CNN and online publications are analysed, plus new 
data gathered through fieldwork among Yezidis in Northern Iraq. Western media draw on and 
reproduce cultural and gender representations, reinstating relations of power infused with 
orientalist and patriarchal tropes. The focus on women’s bodies moves attention away  from 
the workings of namûs “honour” and the suffering of Yezidi men. Some Yezidi women who 
became activists, speaking as victims, are heard internationally; the compromises this entails 
are discussed in light of Fassin and Rechtman’s work on the politics of victimhood
Introduction
This article contributes to the literature on western representations of non-western women in 
conflict by considering western media reporting of the Sinjar genocide of 2014. We use this 
word advisedly, having considered both ISIS’ publications on the subject and multiple 
eyewitness accounts that demonstrate Lemkin’s classic definition of 1946, though detailed 
legal descriptions are beyond the scope of this article. We adopt  a gender perspective on war 
(Enloe, 2000, 2007; Giles and Hyndman, 2004; Cockburn, 2007, Shalhoub-Kevorikian, 
2009) problematising media attention on Yezidi women in the context of the war against 
ISIS. We argue that Sinjari Yezidis’ narratives and subjectivities since 2014 are silenced 
across media representations in the West in favour of a “hyper-visibility” (Baudrillard, 2005, 
1990, 1982) of women’s “injured bodies”, which mobilises a specific narrative of 
victimhood. We will ask what kind of subjectivities lie behind these representations of the 
1  The authors would like to thank: the staff of Yazda.org, especially Matthew Travis Barber, Laila 
Khudaida and Adlay Kejjan; the many anonymous Yezidi interlocutors who informed us through 
interviews and conversations; Kawa Morad for help with translation and interpretation.
2 Veronica Buffon is a doctoral researcher in anthropology at the Institute of Arab and Islamic Studies, 
University of Exeter. Email: v.buffon@exeter.ac.uk. Christine Allison is Ibrahim Ahmed Professor of 
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“injured body” and consider how the paradigm of hyper-visibility of Yezidi women and its 
association with a narrative of victimhood are constructed and disseminated, highlighting the 
modalities through which they  represent women’s experience of war. We will show how the 
Western media draw on and reproduce cultural and gender representations, reinstating 
relations of power infused with orientalist and patriarchal tropes. We will argue that  the 
Western media focus on women’s bodies moves attention away from the very real suffering 
of Yezidi men, the workings of namûs “honour” and the collective nature of the catastrophe, 
which includes the experience of men, women and children. However, we will also note that 
some Yezidi women who became activists are claiming more agency starting from the 
victimhood narrative and are increasingly using their encounters with the Western media and 
their own social media accounts to make their voices heard; we will use Fassin and 
Rechtman’s (2009) work on the politics of victimhood to consider the wider implications of 
this. 
We wish to state at the outset that we do not intend to deny either the magnitude of the 
tragedy lived by the Yezidi community, or the utility of the media interest  in preserving a 
general sense of attention and alert towards the destiny of this minority. We are aware that 
many journalists are working compassionately, with the intention of helping a disadvantaged 
group secure international attention and awareness, and that they regard bearing witness as a 
morally positive act. Reporters often have little role in the editing of their copy or in the 
headlines invented by editors. In a discussion which uses humanitarian organisations in 
Palestine as an example, Fassin and Rechtmann show that proxy testimonies of suffering 
offer “histories without history” – fragments of experience “shuffled to suit the needs of 
humanitarians, to fit the message they wish to communicate.” (2009: 214).  They call for a 
focus on how “the victims have reappropriated this representation of themselves, how they 
are taking it over or diverting it, depending on their situation, how they claim or reject 
it.” (2009: 216). Our interest lies in examining this dynamic further – in identifying how the 
gendered media narratives differ from the views expressed by Yezidis themselves, how they 
fit into the Orientalist wider use of stereotypes of the women and gender relations in the 
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Middle East,3  and how, given the dynamics of power operating, these discourses impose 
constraints on the Yezidis, who are still finding an international voice as a community.  
 In concentrating on women’s bodies, the media discourse reproduces the fascination with 
women’s bodies shown in Orientalist writing and art  since the nineteenth century,4  and sets 
up a narrative of Oriental women who need to be saved (preferably by Westerners), 
emasculating the Yezidi men. Paradoxically, although Yezidis were a focus of 
disproportionate volumes of Western Orientalist narrative in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, Austen Henry  Layard and George Percy Badger being the best known examples in 
English, these writings focused on the Yezidis’ exotic customs and minority  status; they 
contain few comments on the beauty, strength or visibility of Yezidi women, such as are 
found in the writings of E.B. Soane (1912) and Mark Sykes (1915), for example, on the 
Kurds. Moreover, the trope of ‘white men saving brown women from brown men’ (Spivak, 
1994:93) is a feature currently associated predominantly with representations of Muslim 
women, as Abu Lughod has noted in her discussion of the representations of Afghan women 
in English-language sources (2002; 2013). ‘Saving brown women’ produced not only  a 
specific representation of women but most importantly became the justification for military 
intervention (Cooke, 2002: 468).
As material for analysis, we have used specific items from influential English-language 
broadsheets and mainstream online sources. Internet searches, using terms such as “Yazidi/
Yezidi” “Sinjar” “Islamic State,” “Da’esh” and “women”  brought up  many articles, of which 
the most detailed and nuanced came predominantly from the websites of prestigious daily 
broadsheet publications. Here we cite 1 article from the New York Times (US), 3 from the 
Daily Telegraph (UK), 4 from the Guardian (UK), 1 from the Financial Times (UK) - also 1 
from the weekly New Statesman (UK). We also used the websites of large news agencies 
such as the BBC (3 audio/AV broadcast resources), CNN (1 article) and a few other well-
3 In this article we use the term “Orientalism” to highlight  the production of knowledge and the power 
embedded in the creation of truth about “the other”, the Yezidis. Secondly, we reflect on how this 
process reproduces and proves a specific image of Yezidi women and “the women question,” with the 
media as the Western authoritative subject that speaks about the Yezidis.
4 For example, the association made by Flaubert between the Orient  and sex is noted by Said (2003: 
188-190); harem paintings constitute an identifiable genre within nineteenth-century art. 
known publications such as GlobalPost and The Week, which often contain embedded videos. 
We have used the versions archived on the websites as our sources, retrospectively surveying 
articles published since August 2014, although we read many of the articles when they were 
first published. Prestigious broadsheets not only  help to form opinions in the countries they 
serve, but also put reporters on the ground while the events were happening and their feature 
articles tend to give relatively long and nuanced accounts of the events concerned. In the UK, 
the Guardian gives a left-of-centre perspective (as does the New Statesman) and of the right-
of-centre publications, the Telegraph is known in the UK for its strong foreign coverage. 
Both help to form opinions among their political constituencies, and both presented results 
for our searches; by  comparison, the News International-owned The Times presented us with 
relatively little data. Although we did not intend to survey US publications as such, a 
representative of the activist group Yazda.org5  drew attention to the importance of Rukmini 
Callimachi’s work in increasing the Yezidi profile internationally, and especially in 
Washington, hence our inclusion of the New York Times. There is a wider spread of news 
reporting across many different websites in the immediate aftermath of the genocide, that is, 
through August and September 2014, plus flurries of news coverage of subsequent events 
(the liberation of groups of victims over Winter 2014-15, the recapture of the town of Sinjar 
in late 2015, the press releases issued by activist groups etc). However, after October 2014, 
most of the articles are features, prompted by the work or travel of activists such as Nadia 
Murad, or aid enterprises such as Baden-Wurttemburg’s Special Quota project (see below). 
The descriptions of events by  Yezidis constitute new data, taken predominantly  from 
interviews made by Christine in Northern Iraq during her February 2016 fieldwork, 
supplemented with recorded interviews online. 
Description of events and the international media response
In the early hours of 3 August  2014, forces of the so-called Islamic State moved into the 
Yezidi collective town of Sinjar City, located below the southern flank of Mount Sinjar. 
Abandoned by the Kurdish peshmerga garrison charged with protecting them, and knowing 
that the road leading east via Tell ‘Afar was closed to them, the panic-stricken townsfolk 
headed due north up  the mountain, a hard and barren road where many died of exposure or 
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5 Matthew Barber, personal communication, February 2016.
were picked off by their enemies. Elsewhere in the Yezidi settlements around the mountain, 
people fled for their lives on the long road to Duhok, in the Kurdistan region. Some were cut 
off and only escaped when YPG (Yekîneyên Parastina Gel/People’s Protection Units) forces 
from Syria’s Kurdish-held areas (aligned with the PKK (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê/
Kurdistan Workers’ Party) opened up an escape route via Syria. A few remained marooned on 
the mountain, in desperate need of supplies.  Of those who did not leave their homes in time, 
ISIS forced many to choose between conversion to Islam or death. Others were not given the 
choice. Thousands of men were killed (hundreds in the village of Kocho alone) and 
approximately 7,000 women and children taken prisoner and sold into slavery. At the time of 
writing, almost 2 years on, more than 300,000 Sinjari Yezidi displaced persons remain in 
refugee camps in the Iraqi Kurdistan, Syria and Turkey, whilst some 2,500 prisoners remain 
in the hands of ISIS and a constantly increasing number are leaving Iraq, mostly hoping to 
find asylum in Germany or the United States.
The media response to these events passed through various stages. In the immediate 
aftermath, the first week or so, there was a great deal of confusion, not only  about what was 
happening, but about who it was happening to. Many of the “who are the Yezidis?” articles 
reached for comfortable Orientalist staples – ancient origins, timelessness, exoticism, which 
had characterised nineteenth and century  writings on the community. Sean Thomas’ piece of 
7 August 2014 on the Daily Telegraph website opened:
“They are afraid of lettuce. They abhor pumpkins. They practise maybe the oldest 
religion in the world. And now, after at least 6,000 years, they  are finally  being 
exterminated, even as I write this.” 
On 5 August the sole Yezidi member of the Iraqi parliament, Vian Dakhil, had broken down 
as she described the plight of her people in the chamber; her appeal, which covered the 
general humanitarian emergency, was widely reported and viewed online:
“30,000 families have been besieged on Mount Sinjar, without food or water. Our 
women are being taken captive and sold on the slave-market. In the name of humanity 
save us.”
At about the same time, Iraq’s Human Rights Ministry issued a statement that “hundreds” of 
Yezidi women had been reported kidnapped by their families. The spokesman, Kamil Amin, 
used the word “slaves” and said they would be used in “demeaning ways.” This was the 
element of the story which would become dominant. Priya Joshi’s article of 8 August is an 
example of those which included Dakhil’s speech (citing the words above) but led with 
Amin’s announcement concerning the women. 
The humanitarian emergency on the mountain continued to dominate reporting over August 
2014, as the story of the abducted women grew. On 12 August, the Secretary General of the 
UN, Ban Ki-Moon, expressed his “dismay” at the plight of the refugees amid a more general 
call to the government of Iraq to avoid sectarian strife (United Nations News Service, 2014). 
By this time, the first Western journalists had witnessed and reported on the situation; also on 
12 August 2014, the Daily Telegraph website carried an interview with Jonathan Krohn, who 
described the refugees’ journey from Sinjar into Syria, under PYD (Partiya Yekîtiya 
Demokrat/ The Kurdish Democratic Union Party) protection and thence into Iraqi Kurdistan. 
Although Krohn describes the poverty of the Sinjaris and their utter lack of resources with 
compassion, the website’s headline, which is “Mount Sinjar Dispatch: Yezidi refugees “living 
like animals,” probably  reflects an editorial choice rather than that of the journalist. Tracy 
Shelton’s account of one man’s wait in Erbil for news of his family, published in GlobalPost 
on 12 August 2014, was unusual (and remains so) in its voicing of the feelings and viewpoint 
of a Yezidi man.
Meanwhile, the Yezidis themselves were organising and forming pressure groups. The easiest 
to chronicle online is Yazda.org, formed by Yezidis in the USA in the immediate aftermath of 
August 4 and now a small but active NGO delivering advocacy  and humanitarian aid in 
Northern Iraq and lobbying elsewhere. Their immediate goal was to make the Yezidis’ plight 
known globally and to facilitate the liberation of women by  collecting information, tracing 
prisoners wherever possible and mobilising the international community with a view to 
pressuring their governments into using special forces against ISIS to free the captives; as 
early as August 25 they issued a statement saying that airstrikes would not be enough. This 
was complicated by emerging information about the contribution of  KDP (Partiya 
Demokrata Kurdistanê/ Kurdistan Democratic Party) Peshmerga forces- part of the KRG and 
thus an important ally of the West - to the humanitarian disaster by their failure to remain at 
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their posts and protect civilians. This story was first broken on 17 August by Christine van 
den Toorn - tellingly, not in the mainstream press but in the online Daily Beast. 
Although Yazda.org’s press release of August 25 stated that the humanitarian situation on Mt. 
Sinjar remained critical, the abducted women were steadily  becoming the tagline by which 
Yezidis were identified in the international media. This was consolidated by the online 
publication of issue 4 of the purported IS Magazine Dabiq in October 2014, which gave a 
justification for sexual slavery on religious grounds (pp. 14-17), provoking many responses 
in the media. It also ensured that the story  was decisively  taken up by anti-slavery activists, 
such as CNN’s Freedom Project (Watson 2014). Also during this month, Iraqi Yezidis sent a 
delegation to Washington to share information with policy makers on the whereabouts of the 
detainees in the hope of sparking targeted US attacks to liberate the women before they were 
dispersed; although many important contacts were made, this aim was not successful. 
However it was an unprecedented attempt to transcend divisions of clan, political affiliation 
and locality  to speak with a united Yezidi voice. By  December 2014, Amnesty International’s 
report on the abductions was bringing attention to the pressures put by host families 
(sometimes their own relations) and even by Yezidi activists, on women who had escaped 
from IS to speak to the media (Rovera, 2014: 14). However, many  journalists worked more 
sensitively; Rukmini Callimachi’s work in the New York Times on ISIS’ “theology of rape” 
was welcomed by Yazda.org for its responsible approach and for putting the story into a 
wider international space (Matthew Barber, personal communication, February, 2016).
Another strand in the discourse on Yezidi women deals with their association with female 
fighting forces. By October 2014, the media were reporting on the Syrian Kurdish forces who 
had opened up  an escape corridor for the Sinjaris; attention fell mostly  on the female fighters 
(The Week, 7 October 2014). 
The media discourse: Women’s bodies
Drawing on Baudrillard’s analyses of media representation, we conceive hyper-visibility  as 
an insistence or “excess” of visibility, which overloads with signification the object that has 
been represented. The object  becomes therefore transparent, disappearing behind its 
broadcast image. “This is the murder of the image. It  lies in this enforced visibility as the 
source of power and control, beyond even the “panoptical”: it is no longer a question of 
making things visible to an external eye but  to making them transparent to 
themselves” (Baudrillard, 2005: 94). 
The key point about hyper-visibility for Baudrillard is that this insistence of visibility erases 
what lies behind the image, fostering a sense of “obscenity” which privileges the “over 
exposed”, the “all-too-visible”.  The concept of visibility here does not refer only to the realm 
of “images” (photographs and videos), but also includes “speeches” and, more generally, 
discourses produced and disseminated by  the media. According to Baudrillard, this hyper-
visibility  produces a sort of pornographic effect through which the “hypervision in close-up” 
of the object erases the broader context in which action and subjectivity occur (1990: 59-60). 
A plastic image of the corporeal detail is only  visualised and endlessly  disseminated in the 
circuit of communication, producing a magnetic fascination, which however removes the 
holistic dimension of the body and human relationship. When thought of in terms of the 
Yezidi experience, it is the gendered, “injured” body  that is assumed as the object that  the 
image encapsulates, produces and disseminates, effacing the subjects and the complexity of 
the context, while at the same time allowing for the capture of Western audience through an 
allusion to Orientalist tropes. With orientalist tropes we mean here quite conventionally the 
production of essentialising representation of the others which is functional both to political 
domination (Said, 1979), and to the normative constitution of a Western self (Isin, 2015). 
Most of the tropes are organised around a binary and dialectical principle whereby the 
colonial or post colonial world is depicted as a space of irrationality, triviality, cruelty, 
innocence etc which is far more immune to historical change (Sadowski, 1993) allowing for 
the retrospective constitution of the western self as its radical opposite.
As discussed earlier, while media coverage initially focused on the “(re-) discovery” of the 
Yezidis in the Middle East, for example R. Jalabi’s article “Who are the Yezidis and why is 
ISIS hunting them?” (The Guardian, 11 August 2014), the account of their participation in 
conflict in the region later became centred around the theme of sexual violence through a 
victim-perpetrator relationship, with IS fulfilling the role of the hyper-masculine, 
“unenlightened”, sexually abusing perpetrator. Titles such as Rukmini Callimachi’s “ISIS 
enshrines a Theology of Rape” (The New York Times, 13 August 2015), Nussaiba Younis’ 
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“How Isis has established a bureaucracy  of rape” (The Guardian, 16 August 2015),  Martin 
Chulov’s “Yazidis tormented by fears for women and girls kidnapped by Isis jihadis” (The 
Guardian, 11 August 2014), Emma Graham-Harrison’s ‘‘You will stay here until you die”: 
one woman's rescue from Isis” (The Guardian, 26 Dec 2015) – show how “Yezidi women” 
have become not only a key object of inquiry by the media, but  also a genre per se based on a 
narrative of salvation and rescue. 
  The type of commentary we scrutinise in this article enacts a “hyper-visibility” of Yezidi 
women and violence, celebrating a generalised form of “global feminism” which dismisses 
the function of local practices and complexities in the context of Iraq, the specificity of war 
experience in this location, and the macro-systemic variables which have defined such an 
experience over time; that is, the way in which war, conflict  and the very sense of being a 
minority has been shaped by colonial heritage, neo-colonial practices, various ethnic and 
religious tensions, and global capitalism. Only  the dualist relationship  between ISIS and 
Yezidi women (in the form of their “injured body”) remains, dismissing the broader context 
in which this relationship is embodied.  
An interesting example is offered in the BBC program Newshour dedicated to the “Yezidi 
women sex slave ordeal” (22 December 2014). The journalist in this programme asks 
Donatella Rovera, Amnesty senior advisor in Iraq, whether this kind of violence could be 
described as a strategy  adopted by ISIS. Interestingly, Rovera highlights how ISIS’ strategy is 
to annihilate ethnic and religious minorities that “have lived in Iraq for centuries,” forcing 
them out of their territory. While little is said here about the histories of violence that Yezidi 
have suffered in Iraq over time, therefore isolating the dualistic relationship of Yezidi and 
ISIS out of their broader historical context, attention is mostly put on the “corporeal” abuse 
of Yezidi women and their international relevance as now recognisable victims of ISIS. Their 
invisibility in the past (and invisibility of past experiences of violence suffered) is now turned 
into a new visibility as ‘witnesses’ to the violence of ISIS, which finally  endowed them with 
a voice to be broadcast. This is, however, only made possible by highlighting a material and 
corporeal aspect of violence and sexual pleasure in relation to which a logic of salvation can 
be opposed. Hence, the journalist asks whether ISIS’ strategy includes “impregnating Yezidi 
women […] in order to dilute blood line?”; or whether this strategy aims at  achieving “simple 
sexual gratification or encouraging other men to come and join IS”, and whether “those 
[women] who have managed to escape get the help they now need?” It is interesting how the 
journalist uses terms related to the materiality of the body (“blood,” “impregnating”) to 
confirm the brutal practices operated by ISIS, fixing the image of Yezidi women as “victims” 
of individual violence by ISIS members and object of “sexual gratification.” 
In this scenario, how is the hyper-visibility of Yezidi women in war contexts produced, 
knotted, and disseminated? That is, what forms of subjectivities are concealed behind the 
image of the injured body? The injured body conceals the diversity of female roles and 
positions within the Yezidi community, producing a homogenised and undifferentiated image 
of the “abducted woman”. The experiences of older women, children, widows and the 
diversity of socio-economic conditions in the specific context of the Yezidi community are 
thus excluded from the representation that the injured body mobilises. This is also reflected in 
the elaboration of the priorities and the criteria informing “humanitarian intervention 
programmes” whereby humanitarian and medical considerations inevitably end up 
fragmenting and concealing the experience of the community as a whole, while isolating a 
predefined model of woman to be rescued. In Philippe Sands’ article presenting the Baden-
Wurttemberg’s Special Quota Project (2016), which aims at temporarily  relocating 1000 
Yezidi women from refugee camps in Iraq to Germany, Jan Ilhan Kizilhan, the medical head 
of the project, says: 
“It was hell to make such decisions, to decide for that one, yes, you meet the criteria, 
but for another one, no, you do not  [...] The elderly, or girls who were alone, would 
not be selected, the former because it was felt they would not benefit from a 
programme of treatment, the latter because they  should not travel without close family 
members [...] There was one child, she was nine or ten, we decided she could not 
come alone but then, after two months, an aunt  was freed from Da’esh and we agreed 
to bring them both” (Sands, 2016). 
Kizilhan is clearly aware of the rhetoric of rescuing and saving women (Abu Lughod, 2002, 
2013; Das, 2007) and also of the difficulties experienced in the refugee camps. However, 
despite the understandable difficulty of deciding which women can be identified as good 
candidates for the programme, the scrutinisation of Yezidi women’s body  and personhood, 
the action of dividing them by age group and the problems related to the separation of women 
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from their community, demonstrate the mobilisation of a predominant image of Yezidi 
woman to be rescued and healed against those women that do not “meet the criteria” and 
therefore disappear behind that image, an effect which is further enhanced by the media gaze.
But how is this image of the injured body upheld? This is partly  done through the narrative of 
victimhood that the hyper-visibility of the abducted woman instantiates. This narrative, 
however, is sustained by its counter-part in the iconographic representation of Yezidi women: 
the female fighter. After the initial portrayal of the Sinjar massacre as the event where the 
victimhood of Yezidi women was originally produced and made self-evident, a sequel in the 
media representation puts emphasis on the “revenge” that some abducted women have 
embraced by assuming the role of fighters resisting and challenging the misogynist cruelty  of 
ISIS. Interestingly  enough, in the narrative of victimhood, abducted women are constantly 
interviewed and asked to recall and give testimony to the individual violence they have 
suffered. By distancing themselves from this logic, interviewed female fighters actively 
reshape a mode of representation of war experience, which downplays individual trauma in 
favour of a collective sense of belonging and agency. The insistence on a narrative of 
victimhood by the media, however, intervenes here to bring back the image of the injured 
body. As the BBC commentator Jiyar Gol put it on 19 August 2015, when discussing the 
experience of a Yezidi female fighter in the PKK: 
“Avin is shy  and quiet, the commander advised me not to ask about what happened to 
her in captivity  but the scars on her face and hands are a silent testimony. She says she 
is now focused on learning everything she can in order to go back and face her 
abductors” (Gol, 2016). 
In the passage the paternalist narrative of victimhood reproduces the hyper-visibility of 
women’s “injured” body by  assuming the materiality of the body as the ultimate parameter 
against which the truth of Yezidi women can be stated and tested. The impossibility of asking 
Avin about her individual trauma is overcome by the immediate truth that the signs in her 
body reveal, allowing her body to figure as an empty  surface where signification and truth 
can be played despite the real subject embodying the image. Avin is thus forced to coincide 
with hyper-visibility of the body injured, to “transform herself into the image” as Baudrillard 
would put it, adapting to the “jurisdictions of signs” of hyper-visibility (Baudrillard, 1990: 
31). On the one hand, therefore, the female fighters complement the passive figure of the 
victim celebrating the active alter ego of the same figure. On the other hand, their disruptive 
dimension as active subjects and embodiments of collective agency is re-domesticated 
through their re-confinement to the image of the victim. Hence, Avin’s contradictory “nature” 
as a female fighter with a “shy and quiet” character, who has to “learn” how to “go back and 
face her abductors”. 
This example once again shows the modalities of production of gendered and sexualised 
media practices. Victimhood stands here as dispositif or apparatus in a Foucauldian sense; 
that is, a mechanism through which heterogeneous discursive and institutional practices 
concur to structure and implement forms of power relations (Foucault, 1980). An essential 
feature in the apparatus of victimhood is that of protection. The more Yezidi women are 
produced as victims of IS, the more the patriarchal value system of the Yezidi community is 
called into question, with emphasis on the “failing” role of Yezidi men in protecting the 
“honour” of their women. This will be discussed further below.
The Yezidi discourse: Men’s voices and collective suffering
Let us now consider some Yezidi accounts of the Sinjar genocide and its effect on the 
community.  With the exception of a few privileged interlocutors such as Nadia Murad and 
the KDP MP Vian Dakhil, Sinjari Yezidi voices are rarely heard in the international media 
and the data given here, unless stated otherwise, was collected during Christine’s visit to the 
Badinan province and Sinjar in February 2016. 
When one speaks with Sinjari refugees in camps, or with activists, the narratives of the 
genocide begin by embedding the events themselves within their historical and political 
context, which, as mentioned above, is rarely visible in the media stories. The media do not 
tell us that Sinjar has long been a poor region by Iraq’s standards, disadvantaged by 
insufficient healthcare and schooling, with little water; that “Sinjar city” is one of a number 
of collective settlements made during the 1970s when Saddam’s government forcibly 
evacuated ancestral villages; that the inhabitants, under the protection of the KRG but not 
within the Kurdistan region itself and not  benefiting directly from the economic boom 
post-2003, have felt marginalised even in post-Saddam Iraq.6
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6 See Dulz, Savelsberg and Hajo 2008.
As the media coverage freezes their experience of suffering to the present conflict with ISIS, 
what is obscured is the specific way in which Yezidis frame their experience of violence, 
attaching it to a genealogy of ferman (persecutions) and a feeling of being outnumbered and 
surrounded.7 In 1992, they  counted 72 ferman against their community, which, after the 2007 
bombings of the Yezidi communities of Kahtaniya and Siba Sheikh Khidir and then the 2014 
genocide, has now risen to 74 (Sinuni, personal communication, February 2016). A full 
discussion of this worldview is beyond the scope of this article, but anxiety  about the 
abduction of women has long been one of its strong features.8  In 1992, Iraqi Yezidis 
discussed the politics of folkloric songs about the past with Christine. They saw the 
performance of songs by  Muslim singers about love between Yezidi women and Muslim men 
as an act of epistemic violence, and a reflection of a dystopian past where the Muslim 
majority preyed on the women of minorities.9 
In the present circumstances, the abduction of women en masse reduces the Sinjari male to an 
“injured man” unable to fulfil the social expectation to protect his womenfolk that the “rules 
of honour” require (cf. Abu-Lughod, 2000:89-90). As early as 12 August 2014, Tracey 
Shelton’s Sinjari interviewee in Erbil made these rules clear:
“Give me a weapon and I will go to fight. Give the weapons to all the Yazidi men. 
Just give us a chance to fight for our families or die trying. That’s all I ask.”
A young (i.e. aged under 30) Sinjari stranbêj (singer of folkloric songs) living in Rwanga 
community  camp near Zakho explained this further to Christine (February 2016). After 
explaining his great feeling and passion for the old songs of Sinjar, he stated that he would 
not sing them again until “someone comes to protect us or brings our mothers and sisters 
back … or what has happened to us happens to them [i.e. the enemy].”10 He added, “Let the 
7  Although the core meaning of ferman is no more negative than “official decree,” it has come to 
mean “persecution” in the Yezidi context. Cf. Allison 2001: 44, 284. 
8 Yezidis are not alone in this; see Das 2007: 32-33 for Hindu imagery of “the lustful Muslim.”
9 In both 1992 and 2016 Christine heard complaints (first  from non-Sinjari Yezidis, and secondly from 
a Sinjari) of the way non-Yezidi singers performed a song called Keça or Kurê Simoqî (Simoqi girl/
boy) which for them represented abduction of a Yezidi girl.
10 ezê ser karê xwe mînim bes, heta em nabînin yekî me rabe an jî yek da ku dayk u xwiskê me bîne 
… yan jî ya bi sere me hatî, bila bi serê wan jî be. All translations in this article are by Christine 
Allison and Kawa Morad.
men go…but let the girls and ladies return11…a woman is powerless, she has no support.”12 
People don’t know how it feels, he added, to have a sister or daughter calling on the phone 
saying “come and save me…”
As it is incumbent on men to protect women and children, the young singer makes it clear 
that there is shame surrounding these events for Sinjari men: 
“We don’t know what to say  [i.e. we are at a loss/embarrassed]…we won’t go back to 
Sinjar, we have no faith left… it’s finished…”
Describing the flight over the mountain in the context of the singers’ practice of 
immortalising persecutions or ferman in songs, which often praise the heroism (literally 
“manliness”) of heroes, he said, 
“A ferman happened to us, we don’t know who to praise, we don’t know whose 
heroism to praise… there was nobody [lit. we saw nobody] to help us…”13 
Little children were “thrown aside” (avêtî). At a moment when such things could happen, 
when children could be cast aside, there is no hero with manly virtue (mêranî) to praise. 
Pursuing the subject  of children, he said, it  didn’t matter if he went hungry  or thirsty  himself, 
but he worried about protecting his own children. “I wish they had never been born,” he 
added. The despair resulting from their inability to provide help and protection highlight the 
sense of powerlessness men experience as an effect of the assault, which produce a de facto 
feminisation of the whole community in this war context, as they are subsumed into the 
narrative of victimhood.
The singer quoted above had no female members of his immediate family  in captivity, but  his 
words tally  with accounts of those who do. During the first public conference to be held on 
the Yezidi genocide, at the American University of Suleymani, Iraqi Kurdistan, on 11 
February 2016 (which Christine attended), several survivors spoke publicly  about their 
experiences. One, a man named Kiçê, who came from Kocho, described the massacre of the 
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11 Kec and khanom bên, mêr bila biçin…
12 Jin bê dest e … desthilatiya wê nîne.
13 Ji ber ku em nizanin çi bêjin, em neçine Singal…baweriya me nema…xelas bû……
Ferman me rabû em nizanin emê medhê kê bikin, em nizanim mêraniya kê pesin bidin 
…Me kesekî xwe nedît.
men (which he survived by  chance) and the abduction of the women, including women from 
his own close family; he stated that, although he suffered various symptoms, he had had no 
psychological help. Another account of the Kocho massacre, given shortly after the event by 
Nayef Jassem (17 August 2014) in a video from Associated Press embedded in the Daily 
Telegraph website, speaks in similar terms: the delivery is factual and deadpan, with the 
telling comments at the end: “I just want for my  family to be in a safe place; I wish I had 
been killed there instead of them, that’s what I want.” An aid worker told Christine at the 
same conference that a number of Yezidi men have lost their own womenfolk and live alone 
in camps, or with groups of other similarly  afflicted men. A Yezidi woman from the Sinuni 
area north of Mount Sinjar who lived in Bajit Kandala camp  near Zakho, affirmed this, 
saying that she and other women nearby took turns to cook for one such man who lived 
nearby. Camp life presents many  challenges for men in general; the current economic crisis in 
Iraqi Kurdistan makes it extremely difficult to find work to provide for the family. We 
conjecture that this affects their wellbeing further, though we know of no studies so far on 
this. But it  is perhaps worth noting that in an article by Lara Whyte in the New Statesman 
profiling the Baden-Wurttemburg project of giving women psychological treatment in 
Germany (26 January  2016), the women’s only criticism of the project is that it  does not 
include men over 18.
In Western media discourse, the hyper-visibility  of the Yezidi woman is accompanied by an 
invisibility and silencing of the Yezidi male. He is sidelined, leaving little room for a 
discussion of his experience whether as resistance fighter or as wounded survivor. There is no 
focus on men’s bodies as a counterpoint to those of women; nor are the sufferings of boys 
problematised, though boys do suffer; for example, it is known in the region that pre-
adolescent Yezidi boys who have been taken captive are being trained by ISIS as suicide 
bombers (personal conversations, Yazda staff, February 2016). The absence of the Yezidi 
male voice also masks one of the central aspects of this genocide for the Yezidis, namely its 
collective nature. It is the whole group which has been violated.
Yezidi voices in the media
The events in Sinjar gave Yezidis an unprecedented opportunity  to speak to the world. 
Although the senior members of the Yezidi religious council (the Majlis-i Ruhanî), who are 
mostly  from the Sheikhan area, have spoken publicly  through their links with the Kurdistan 
Regional Government (KRG), Sinjari voices have now also made themselves heard in the 
West. Yazda took a strong role in this with their support of the delegation which visited 
Washington in October 2014, but the advocacy  and dialogue process also continues through 
Yezidi groups in Germany, most of whom, like Jan Ilhan Kizilhan, have roots in Turkey. 
Some, though not all, of these are aligned with the Kurdish movement from Turkey.
Fassin and Rechtman (2009: 275) see the current prominence of victim testimonies and the 
valorisation of bearing witness as the culmination of a long process, whereby victimhood 
develops from a source of shame into a strong position from which to speak. This, they note, 
recalls Reinhardt Koselleck’s prediction that in the future, history would become a 
“historiography of the vanquished” (2002: 76-83). Within the international discourse of 
human rights, a victim’s story can be heard, understood and valued by the world, indeed there 
are few other forms of communication open to the subaltern. This is the framework within 
which the Yezidis can make their voice heard and put  forward their agenda as a minority  in 
the international arena.
Another important contextual element here is the political climate of Kurdistan and the 
emphasis placed on narratives of Kurdish suffering and victimhood. Before the rise of ISIS, 
the demand for the “Anfal” campaigns (of deportation and massacre undertaken by the 
Ba’ath regime against Kurdish civilians during the 1980s) to be accepted as a genocide, was a 
keynote of Kurdish international relations. Crimes against humanity  committed by  the 
Saddam Hussein regime were (and are) memorialised, through statues, museums, 
investigations and oral history projects with victim narratives and testimonies figuring 
strongly (Fischer-Tahir, 2012). However, it is noticeable that there are still some kinds of 
victimhood which are difficult to enunciate and these are often associated with namûs. In 
Turkey, for example, memories of extremely humiliating violence suffered in prisons may be 
evoked in public discourse (e.g. in published prison diaries). However, women still find it 
difficult to express their experiences of rape or sexual violence (e.g. Aras, 2014: 95-96); 
accounts of this violence are not part of the public domain in the same way.  In Iraq, the 
iconic “Anfal woman” is represented as mother and/or widow, but is rarely if ever described 
as a rape victim. Thus, although the politics of victimhood and suffering within Kurdistan 
interface well with the Yezidis’ own consciousness of persecution over many years, the 
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placing of the international gaze squarely  on female bodies and the namûs issue is extremely 
painful for the whole community.
Some of the protest  politics in Kurdistan have centred on the “ownership” of victimhood. The 
destruction of the Halabja genocide monument in 2006 by the people of Halabja themselves 
had its origins in public discontent at the slow pace of regeneration and a strong feeling that 
the KRG was using the suffering of victims to raise international money without channelling 
that money back to the victims themselves (cf. Watts, 2012). Some Anfal women have had a 
complex relationship with the way they have been publicly represented by the political 
establishment (Mlodoch, 2012). It is not surprising, then that while some of the most active 
Yezidi campaigners who speak to the media, such as Vian Dakhil and the activist Khidir 
Dommle in Duhok, are members of the KDP, other groups favour media spokespersons 
without such connections. Yazda.org, for instance, has sponsored the visits made by Nadia 
Murad to Europe and the USA (see below). 
In formulating responses to the fall of Sinjar, Yezidis are negotiating with the politics of 
victimhood at a number of levels, within the community, in Kurdistan and Iraq, and 
internationally. Many young men (and some women) have joined the fight for Sinjar, 
enlisting in a number of defence units aligned with various political forces; the politics of 
these is beyond the scope of this article. But for the first time, spokespersons have stepped 
forward whose permission to speak comes not from their hereditary  authority (like the 
religious leaders), nor their local political role (like the village leaders or the Yezidi MPs Vian 
Dakhil and Amira Hassan), but from their own experience of suffering. In the international 
discourse, the women’s narratives of victimhood are privileged over men’s and the female 
voice is audible on the media, as we discussed earlier, because it is in line with the brutality 
of ISIS.  
The most prominent of these survivors is the UN good will ambassador Nadia Murad, who, 
backed by Yazda.org, has visited many senior politicians worldwide and addressed the UN 
Security Council.  A former IS prisoner who managed to escape, Ms. Murad has secured 
support from prominent figures (most recently the human rights lawyer Amal Clooney, who 
has agreed to represent her) and has been nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize. She keeps the 
story of the women still in captivity in the media but in her frequent tweets places a greater 
emphasis on the entire and collective nature of the crime, placing her cause within the 
framework of international human rights. She leads on her website, nadia-murad.com, with 
her aim to have the crime against the Yezidis internationally accepted as genocide. She 
describes herself there as “survivor of enslavement and human trafficking” and “human rights 
activist.” She visited the UK in February  2016, when as mentioned above, the Daily 
Telegraph website’s headline described her as “former sex slave.”
During the same visit, Nadia Murad was interviewed for the BBC discussion programme 
HARDtalk (2016), by  journalist Sarah Montague. Nadia recalled her personal experience 
before and during the captivity  and how she managed to escape. Sarah Montague framed all 
her questions in the perpetrator-victim continuum; she reminded us that Nadia exists and has 
a voice as an “abducted woman” who survived. This is visible by looking at the questions 
posed:
“When you think about the man who raped you in the time you were held what do you want 
to happen to them?” “There are young people all over the world who are attracted by  what 
the Islamic State is doing, what do you say  to them?” “There are many women who have 
been held who killed themselves out of desperation - was it something that  at the time you 
thought about?” “I wonder you did not question your faith?” “You said they  told you to 
convert to Islam, did you think about that?”
Despite the framing of these questions in terms of Nadia as a victim, Ms. Murad manages to 
escape her role as simple vulnerable actor and manifest a sense of agency and self 
assertiveness. As well as affirming her faith in God she says:
“I have never thought of killing myself, either before or after I was captured by 
Da’esh, it has never occurred to me. I believe that everyone should accept what God 
has given them (...) we must all endure.”
Despite her instrumental and political functioning in the public discourse of the West, Nadia 
succeeded to become politically  vocal for her own community through her vivid descriptions 
of the reality lived by  Yezidis. By accepting the media morbidity related to the details of her 
captivity she embraces the “tactical dimension of trauma” (based on the social significance of 
the trauma) which recognises the “social intelligence of the actors involved” (Fassin and 
Rechtman, 2009: 10-11).
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When Nadia answered the question posed by  Sarah Montague “Do you also want to see 
soldiers going in from Western countries to take on IS” with “I don’t  really  understand 
military matters” she purposely moved the discussion away from the violence suffered. She 
precisely named her expectations in regard to the “ethical” Western military forces in context 
of war (respectful towards women and children in opposition to the brutality  of ISIS). 
Furthermore, Nadia reminded the audience that in the occupied areas in Syria and Iraq 
regular people who do not support ISIS, Muslim families who were active in helping her and 
other women, were also suffering therefore “International forces must stop  Da’esh and bring 
them to justice.”  By recognising the dignity of the victims and their request, Sarah Montague 
reproduced the west as the generous benefactor which can act now through military 
intervention (Cook, 2002: 468).
In campaigning for international recognition of the genocide, Nadia is in line with Yezidi 
lawyers in Iraq and Yezidi activists more generally. As well as the wish for justice to be done, 
Yezidis are aware that  special security arrangements for Sinjar, which would permit a more 
concerted return home, will be more likely  if Western allies recognise that genocide has taken 
place. Moreover, within the current discursive environment of international acknowledgment 
of the inviolability  of human rights, in the aftermath of Bosnia and Rwanda, genocide is the 
ultimate crime. The controversy over recognition of the Armenian genocide is well known in 
the region and a major part of discussions in Turkey about the Kurds’ past. Before June 2014, 
the KRG’s key  international demand was its campaign for Anfal to be internationally 
recognised as genocide (Fischer-Tahir, 2012). Apart from any more concrete benefits, success 
would inscribe the stateless Kurds into international frames of reference. Therefore, it is not 
surprising that the Yezidis too, having lost faith in their own country’s ability  to protect them, 
are seeking justice by this route, using international terms of reference rather than local 
structures.
Conclusion
We have analysed English-language media representations of the Sinjar genocide, and found 
that they focus predominantly on the bodies of suffering Yezidi women and on their sexual 
slavery. In doing so, the genocide becomes gendered and not only  the suffering of Yezidi 
men, but their very voices are effaced. By contrast the discourse of the Yezidis themselves 
foregrounds the collective nature of the genocide and sets it within a historical framework of 
persecution and marginalisation. 
The Yezidi community has publicly  suffered pain which remains unspeakable even within the 
current acceptability  of narratives of victimhood in Kurdistan. A community  which venerates 
blood succession as a guarantee of purity  has lost control of its reproductivity.14  Families 
have lost livelihoods, women have lost the reputation they valued and men have been 
emasculated. Many despair; however, great resources within the community have been 
revealed in their responses to these events. Not only have Yezidis made an unprecedented 
decision to welcome violated women home without loss to the honour (namûs) of their 
families; they  have united as never before to speak out on these matters and to advocate an 
approach which moves on from established practices of localised revenge towards a 
campaign for justice and security at international levels. Through the media presence of 
figures such as Nadia, who are not affiliated with political parties within Iraq, Yezidis are 
taking their claim of genocide directly into the international arena. This provides a fillip for 
the efforts of Yezidi lawyers in Iraq, who struggle with formidable legal difficulties both 
within Iraq, as Sinjar is a disputed territory, and outside. US Secretary  of State John Kerry’s 
announcement of 17 March 2016, in which he described the attack on the Sinjari Yezidi 
community  as “genocide,” constitutes a milestone in the Yezidis’ fight for international 
recognition, though the route to eventual prosecutions remains long and complex.
Fassin and Rechtman (2009: 274) note that in the context of asylum claims, the professional 
discourse from lawyers and clinicians on psychic trauma “speaks only the truth about the 
victim that society  is prepared to hear.”15 It seems that the same is true of media discourse. 
The media gendering of the genocide does not match the collective nature of the trauma as 
lived and narrated by the Yezidis. Yet in order to be heard, the Yezidis are forced to abide by 
the agendas of Western discourse, which they  have not set  themselves. The unequal power 
dynamic drives a hard bargain. The voices of Yezidis such as Nadia are securing international 
20
14 This story, that in addition to rape, the women were given the contraceptive pill, often without  their 
knowledge, broke in March 2016 and was covered, among others, by Rukmini Callimachi in the New 
York Times.
15 Their point  is that  society finds it  much more acceptable to focus on the general principles of a link 
between violence and trauma rather than proof of that damage in individual cases.
support for the Yezidi case, but the cost  of this, thus far, has been an unblinking spotlight 
placed on the community’s deepest hurt.
 
The Yezidis, always subaltern in the countries where they  have lived, practise a unique 
religion and culture which for hundreds of years has frequently  found itself in conflict with 
local manifestations of Islam. It is ironic that, in terms of gender, the way in which they  are 
represented in international contexts, a mode of representation in which they acquiesce, for 
pragmatic reasons, -bears many similarities to the issues faced by Muslims. The perspectives 
given by gender studies scholarship enable these wider dynamics of subalternity  and 
intersectionality, which may not be obvious within an oppositional framework of Yezidi 
identities versus Muslim identities, to be discerned. Today, the challenge faced by Yezidis, 
who are seeking social justice and international recognition, is also related to their exclusive 
existence, presence or status in the world as possible victims of genocide. 
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